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Abstract: We determine the optimal strategies for purchasing term life insurance and for investing in
a risky financial market in order to maximize the probability of reaching a bequest goal while consuming
from an investment account. We extend Bayraktar and Young (2015) by allowing the individual to
purchase term life insurance to reach her bequest goal. The premium rate for life insurance, h, serves
as a parameter to connect two seemingly unrelated problems. As the premium rate approaches 0,
covering the bequest goal becomes costless, so the individual simply wants to avoid ruin that might
result from her consumption. Thus, as h approaches 0, the problem in this paper becomes equivalent to
minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin, which is solved in Young (2004). On the other hand, as the
premium rate becomes arbitrarily large, the individual will not buy life insurance to reach her bequest
goal. Thus, as h approaches infinity, the problem in this paper becomes equivalent to maximizing the
probability of reaching the bequest goal when life insurance is not available in the market, which is
solved in Bayraktar and Young (2015).
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1. Introduction
We determine the optimal strategies for purchasing term life insurance and for investing in a risky
financial market in order to maximize the probability of reaching a bequest goal while consuming
from an investment account. We extend Bayraktar and Young (2015) by allowing the individual to
purchase term life insurance to reach her bequest goal. The premium rate for life insurance, h, serves
as a parameter to connect two seemingly unrelated problems. As the premium rate approaches 0,
covering the bequest goal becomes costless, so the individual simply wants to avoid ruin that might
result from her consumption. Thus, as h approaches 0, the problem in this paper becomes equivalent to
minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin, which is solved in Young (2004). On the other hand, as the
premium rate becomes arbitrarily large, the individual will not buy life insurance to reach her bequest
goal. Thus, as h approaches infinity, the problem in this paper becomes equivalent to maximizing the
probability of reaching the bequest goal when life insurance is not available in the market, which is
solved in Bayraktar and Young (2015).
2The work in this paper combines two areas of research. One area is the optimal purchase of
life insurance. There are two traditional reasons for buying life insurance: (1) protecting household
income when a wage earner dies, and (2) individuals wishing to leave bequests to their children or
other heirs. To address the first problem, researchers generally assume households wish to maximize
utility of consumption and, perhaps, bequest. For example, Bayraktar and Young (2013) maximize
expected exponential utility of a household’s consumption when an income earner might die; they
determine the optimal investment and life insurance purchasing strategies.1 Pliska and Ye (2007) have
no risky asset in their financial market, and the optimal strategy for purchasing insurance decreases
with increasing wealth. By contrast, Richard (1975) includes a risky asset in his financial market, and
the optimal strategy for purchasing insurance increases with wealth.2 Thus, the presence of a risky
asset can affect the optimal strategy for purchasing insurance; we note a similar difference in Section
3 of this paper.
The other area is the optimal control of wealth to reach a goal. Research on this topic began
with the seminal work of Dubins and Savage (1965, 1976) and continued with the work of Pestien and
Sudderth (1985), Orey et al. (1987), Sudderth and Weerasinghe (1989), Kulldorff (1993), Karatzas
(1997), and Browne (1997, 1999a, and 1999b). A typical problem considered in this research is to
control a process to maximize the probability the process reaches b, either before a fixed time T , such
as in Karatzas (1997), or before the process reaches a < b, such as in Pestien and Sudderth (1985).
In either of these forms of the problem, the game ends if wealth reaches b. The problem we consider
in this paper is similar in that we control a wealth process to maximize the probability of reaching b
before 0, but we want to reach b at a random time, namely, the time of death of the investor. The
game does not end if wealth reaches b before the investor dies; the game only ends when the individual
dies or ruins.
Related goal-seeking research in insurance economics focuses on minimizing the probability of
financial ruin of an infinitely-lived insurance company by controlling, for example, investment in a risky
financial market and purchasing reinsurance; see Schmidli (2002) and Promislow and Young (2005) for
two relatively early papers in this area. By contrast with that line of research, we focus on individual
decision making, which includes the possibility of bankruptcy, as in Schmidli (2002), but which also
includes the possibility of death and incorporates life insurance in the market to “compensate” the heirs
when that event occurs. If an insurance company were to maximize the probability of being prepared
for a catastrophe, then that problem would be more closely related to what we are considering in this
paper.
Bayraktar, Promislow, and Young (2014, 2015) introduce the problem of allowing the individual
to buy life insurance in order to reach a bequest goal. In that work, the individual does not consume
from the investment account, nor is there a risky asset in which the individual could invest. The
only uncertainty is the time of death. Bayraktar, Promislow, and Young (2014) consider a time-
homogeneous model in which the hazard rate λ and the riskless return r are constant. We discuss the
results of that paper at the beginning of Section 3. Bayraktar, Promislow, and Young (2015) extend
their 2014 paper by allowing the hazard rate to vary deterministically with time, while keeping the
1 In a paper with a similar model, but without life insurance available to protect income, Vellekoop
and Davis (2009) maximize utility of consumption when income might cease due to a random event.
2 In both of those papers, the authors maximize expected utility of consumption plus expected
utility of wealth at the time of death.
3remainder of the model the same. One interesting result from the latter paper is that if the future
lifetime random variable is uniformly distributed on [0, T ], then the optimal strategy for purchasing
life insurance is as follows: (1) If r ≤ 1
T
, then it is optimal for the individual to buy full life insurance
until death or ruin, whichever comes first. (2) If r > 1
T
, then it is optimal not to buy life insurance
until time T − 1
r
, after which time, it is optimal to buy full life insurance until death or ruin.
Then, Bayraktar and Young (2015) consider the problem of reaching the bequest goal with no
life insurance available in the market but, unlike Bayraktar, Promislow, and Young (2014, 2015), the
individual consumes from her investment account and there is a risky asset in which the individual
could invest. The main contributions of Bayraktar and Young (2015) are (1) to prove the duality
between the bequest problem and an optimal stopping problem in a particular case (see Sections 4.1
and 4.2); and (2) to emend some details of Browne (1997) (see Theorem 4.3 and Remark 4.1). Also,
that paper provides some mathematical background for the methods used in this paper.
In this paper, we extend the work of Bayraktar and Young (2015) by including life insurance in
the market. (Also, we extend Bayraktar, Promislow, and Young (2014) by including a risky asset and
non-zero consumption.) The resulting optimal strategy for purchasing life insurance is very different
from the one found in Bayraktar, Promislow, and Young (2014). Specifically, when there is no risky
asset, if the mortality rate is less than the riskless return, the optimal strategy is not to buy life
insurance until wealth reaches the safe level; otherwise, if the mortality rate is greater than the riskless
return, the optimal strategy is to buy life insurance if wealth is less than some level. When there is a
risky asset and when the rate of consumption is large enough, it is optimal for the individual to buy
insurance at all levels of wealth, a result we did not expect; otherwise, for lower rates of consumption,
it is optimal to buy insurance only when wealth is greater than some level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the financial and insurance
market in which the individual invests, we formalize the problem of maximizing the probability of
reaching a bequest goal, and we give a verification lemma that will help us to find that maximum
probability, along with the optimal strategies for investing in the financial market and for purchasing
term life insurance. In Section 3, we solve the problem of maximizing the probability of reaching
a bequest goal when the rate of consumption is zero; we separate this case because we can solve it
explicitly. Sections 4 and 5 parallel Section 3 for a positive rate of consumption. In that case, we
have an explicit solution only when the rate of consumption is large enough but not too large (Section
4.1). Otherwise, we solve the problem by solving for the convex Legendre transform of the maximum
probability and, then, use the verification lemma to prove that our ansatz is, indeed, the maximum
probability of reaching the bequest goal.
In Section 6, we prove properties of the solution obtained in Sections 3 through 5. In particular,
we show that, as the premium rate for life insurance h increases, the maximum probability of reaching
the bequest goal (weakly) decreases, and the optimal amount invested in the risky asset (weakly)
increases. Furthermore, we show that as h approaches 0, the maximum probability of reaching the
bequest goal and the optimal amount invested in the risky asset approach 1 minus the minimum
probability of lifetime ruin and the corresponding optimal strategy, respectively. Also, we show that
as h approaches ∞, the solution to the problem in this paper approaches the solution in Bayraktar
and Young (2015) for the problem of maximizing the probability of reaching a bequest goal without
life insurance available in the market. Finally, at the end of Section 6, we provide numerical examples
to illustrate our results. Section 7 concludes the paper.
42. Statement of the problem and verification lemma
In this section, we define the financial and insurance market in which the individual invests. Then,
we state the optimization problem this individual faces and present a verification lemma we use in
Sections 3 through 5 to solve the optimization problem.
2.1. Financial market and probability of reaching the bequest goal
We assume the individual has an investment account she manages in order to reach a given bequest
goal b. She consumes from this account at the constant rate c. The individual invests in a Black-
Scholes financial market with one riskless asset earning interest at the rate r ≥ 0 and one risky asset
whose price process S = {St}t≥0 follows geometric Brownian motion:
dSt = µSt dt+ σ St dBt,
in which B = {Bt}t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion on a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F =
{Ft}t≥0,P), with µ > r and σ > 0.
Let Wt denote the wealth of the individual’s investment account at time t ≥ 0. Let πt denote
the dollar amount invested in the risky asset at time t ≥ 0. An investment policy Π = {πt}t≥0 is
admissible if it is an F-progressively measurable process satisfying
∫ t
0
π2s ds <∞ almost surely, for all
t ≥ 0.
Denote the future lifetime random variable of the individual by τd. We assume τd follows an
exponential distribution with mean 1/λ. We assume the individual buys life insurance via a premium
paid continuously at the rate of h > 0 per dollar of insurance. Furthermore, we assume the individual
can change the amount of her insurance coverage at any time, that is, the individual may purchase
so-called instantaneous term life insurance. Bayraktar et al. (2014, Section 3.1) assume h ≥ λ, but we
allow h < λ in this paper to account for imperfect information of the insurer in pricing life insurance
for a particular individual.
Let Dt denote the amount of death benefit payable at time τd in force at time t ≥ 0. An insurance
strategy D = {Dt}t≥0 is admissible if it is F-progressively measurable and non-negative. Thus, with
instantaneous term life insurance, wealth follows the dynamics
{
dWt = (rWt + (µ− r)πt − c− hDt) dt+ σ πt dBt, 0 ≤ t < τd,
Wτd =Wτd− +Dτd−.
(2.1)
We assume the individual seeks to maximize the probability that Wτd ≥ b, by optimizing over
admissible controls (Π,D). Because of the constant drain on wealth by the negative drift term −c,
financial ruin might occur before death, and we end the game if wealth reaches 0 before the individual
dies. Define τ0 = inf{t ≥ 0 :Wt ≤ 0}, and define the value function by
φ(w) = sup
(Π,D)
Pw (Wτd∧τ0 ≥ b) , (2.2)
in which Pw denotes conditional probability given W0 = w ≥ 0. We refer to φ as the maximum
probability of reaching the bequest goal, with the understanding that if ruin occurs before death, then
the bequest goal cannot be attained.
5Remark 2.1. We assume that the individual’s consumption rate c is constant and exogenously
given. If the individual were allowed to control her consumption process {ct}, then, to maximize the
probability of reaching her bequest goal, she would optimally choose ct ≡ 0 almost surely, for all t ≥ 0.
In that case, we argue that the individual would starve to death. Therefore, we assume that there is a
subsistence level, as in Sethi et al. (1992), below which the individual will not reduce her consumption.
The consumption rate c in this paper represents that subsistence level.
The results of this paper will give the optimal investment and life insurance purchasing strategies
for a given value of c, along with the maximum probability of reaching a bequest goal. The individual
can, then, vary c and compare the resulting strategies and value function to better understand her
options. A natural extension, then, is to allow a time-varying rate of consumption (varying as a
deterministic function of time or of wealth), and we invite the interested reader to pursue this problem.
Remark 2.2. As the premium rate for life insurance approaches 0+, then the bequest goal can be
covered without cost, and the problem reduces to the one of minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin
(Young, 2004). On the other hand, as the premium rate becomes arbitrarily large, then we expect the
individual to buy no life insurance, and the problem reduces to the one of maximizing the probability
of reaching the bequest without life insurance in the market (Bayraktar and Young, 2015). Thus, the
problem solved in this paper connects these two seemingly unrelated problems as the premium rate
varies from 0 to ∞; see the work in Section 6 below for results proving the continuity of our solution
as h→ 0+ and as h→∞.
Remark 2.3. If wealth is large enough, say at least ws (“s” for safe), then the individual can invest
all her wealth in the riskless asset with the interest income sufficient to cover her consumption and
insurance premium for death benefit (b − ws)+. That is, wealth ws generates interest of rws =
c+ h(b− ws)+. By solving this equation for ws, we obtain
ws =


c+hb
r+h , if 0 ≤ c ≤ rb,
c
r
, if c > rb,
(2.3)
which we call the safe level. Thus, φ(w) = 1 if w ≥ ws, and it remains for us to determine φ(w) for
0 < w < ws.
2.2 Verification lemma
In this section, we provide a verification lemma that states that a smooth solution to a boundary-
value problem (BVP) associated with the maximization problem in (2.2) equals the value function
φ. Therefore, we can reduce our problem to one of solving a BVP. We state the verification lemma
without proof because its proof is similar to others in the literature; see, for example, Schmidli (2002,
Theorem 1), Promislow and Young (2005, Theorem 2.1), or Wang and Young (2012, Theorem 3.1 and
Corollary 3.1).
First, for π ∈ R and D ≥ 0, define a differential operator Lpi,D by its action on a test function f ,
whose definition is derived from the wealth dynamics in (2.1):
Lpi,D f = (rw + (µ− r)π − c− hD)fw +
1
2
σ2π2fww − λ
(
f − 1{w+D≥b}
)
. (2.4)
6Lemma 2.1. Let Φ = Φ(w) be a C2([0, ws]) function for which Φw > 0 and Φww < 0 in (0, ws).
Suppose Φ satisfies the following BVP on [0, ws] :

max
pi,D≥0
Lpi,D Φ(w) = 0,
Φ(0) = 0, Φ(ws) = 1.
(2.5)
Then, on [0, ws],
φ = Φ,
the optimal amount invested in the risky asset is given in feedback form by
π∗t = −
µ− r
σ2
Φw(W ∗t )
Φww(W ∗t )
, (2.6)
in which W ∗t is the optimally controlled wealth at time t, and the optimal amount of instantaneous
term life insurance equals
D∗t = (b−W
∗
t )1{wb≤W∗t ≤min(ws,b)}, (2.7)
in which
wb = inf{w ≥ 0 : λ− h(b− w) Φw(w) ≥ 0} ∧ b. (2.8)
Remark 2.4. Note that the optimal amount of life insurance to buy at any instant is either 0 or
b− w, as written in (2.7). If c > rb, then the safe level c
r
> b, and it is optimal not to buy insurance
when b ≤Wt <
c
r
. Thus, we can rewrite (2.5) as


λ
(
Φ− 1{w≥wb}
)
=
(
rw − c− h(b− w)1{wb≤w≤min(ws,b)}
)
Φw +max
pi
[
(µ− r)πΦw +
1
2
σ2π2Φww
]
,
Φ(0) = 0, Φ(ws) = 1.
(2.9)
Remark 2.5. The problem of maximizing the probability of reaching the bequest goal scales jointly
with wealth w, the bequest goal b, and the rate of consumption c. Specifically, if we write φ = φ(w; b, c),
wb = wb(b, c), and π
∗ = π∗(w; b, c) to denote the dependence of φ and the optimal strategies on w, b,
and c, then the following relationships hold. For any constant k > 0,
φ(kw; kb, kc) = φ(w; b, c), (2.10)
wb(kb, kc) = k wb(b, c), (2.11)
and
π∗(kw; kb, kc) = k π∗(w; b, c). (2.12)
The reader will observe these relationships in the solutions in Sections 3 through 5.
Because of this scaling, we could set, say, b = 1, solve for φ, wb, and π
∗ with b = 1, then
obtain the more general quantities as follows: φ(w; b, c) = φ(w/b; 1, c/b), wb(b, c) = b wb(1, c), and
π∗(w; b, c) = b π∗(w/b; 1, c/b). Alternatively, we could set c = 1 and proceed similarly. We choose
not to set b = 1 or c = 1 because we want to allow b → 0 and observe that the solution approaches
7the one for minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin, and we want to keep c general in order to
compare the optimal investment strategy to other optimal investment strategies for which c plays a
role. Furthermore, setting b = 1 or c = 1 does not simplify the mathematical analysis, except to
remove one parameter.
Remark 2.6. Bayraktar and Young (2009) considered the problem of minimizing shortfall at death
without life insurance in the market; they found that the optimal amount to invest in the risky asset is
greater than the optimal amount when minimizing lifetime shortfall. If we were to add life insurance
to the market when minimizing Ew[(b−Wτd∧τ0)+] (again, with the understanding that the game ends
if wealth reaches 0, or equivalently, 0 is an absorbing state for the wealth process), then because the
price of life insurance and the shortfall target are (piecewise) linear in the size of the death benefit, if
it is optimal to buy any amount of life insurance, it will be optimal to buy b − w. Furthermore, we
anticipate that the corresponding value function, V , will be decreasing and convex; if so, the optimal
life insurance purchasing strategy will be given by (2.7) for wb = inf{w ≥ 0 : λ + h Vw(w) ≥ 0} ∧ b,
and V will solve the following BVP:

λ(V − (b− w)+) = (rw − c)Vw +min
pi
[
(µ− r)π Vw +
1
2
σ2π2Vww
]
− (b− w)(λ+ hVw)1{wb≤w≤min(ws,b)},
V (0) = b, V (ws) = 0.
Thus, even though V measures the magnitude of the shortfall, and not just whether there is shortfall,
the optimal insurance purchasing strategy is of the same form as for the bequest goal problem solved
in this paper.
In the following sections, we use Lemma 2.1 to calculate φ. The solution differs depending on
whether c = 0, 0 < c ≤ rb, or c > rb, so we split the problem into those three cases in the next three
sections. Specifically, in Section 3, we consider the case for which c = 0 and explicitly determine φ. In
Sections 4 and 5, we consider the cases for which 0 < c ≤ rb and c > rb, respectively, and express φ
through its convex Legendre transform (a technique employed in Bayraktar and Young (2007, 2015)),
except for the special case in Section 4.1, for which we can write φ explicitly.
3. The case for which c = 0
Bayraktar et al. (2014, Section 3.1) computed the maximum probability of reaching the bequest
goal in the case for which c = 0, with no risky asset in the market; let φd denote the maximum
probability in this deterministic case. In that work, we found that if r ≥ λ, then the individual does
not buy insurance until her wealth reaches the safe level ws =
hb
r+h
. At the other extreme, if r+h ≤ λ,
then for all levels of wealth, the individual buys term life insurance of b−w until death or ruin because
insurance is cheap enough and the riskless return is low enough relative to the hazard rate.
Otherwise, if r < λ < r + h, then for wealth less than a certain value (w∗ in that paper), the
individual buys term life insurance of b−w until death or ruin, while for wealth greater than w∗, she
does not buy insurance until her wealth reaches the safe level. We showed that φd equals
φd(w) =


1−
(
1− w
ws
) λ
r+h
, if 0 ≤ w < w∗,
(
w
ws
)λ
r
, if w∗ ≤ w ≤ ws =
hb
r+h ,
(3.1)
8in which w∗ = 0 if r ≥ λ; otherwise, if r < λ, 0 < w∗ < ws is the unique value that makes φ
d
continuous. In (3.1), 1−
(
1− w
ws
) λ
r+h
is the probability of reaching the bequest goal if the individual
buys term life insurance of b−w until she dies or ruins, and
(
w
ws
)λ
r
is the probability of reaching the
bequest goal if the individual does not buy insurance until her wealth reaches the safe level. When
there is no risky asset, the individual buys life insurance at low wealth levels when λ > r because
the probability that her wealth will reach the safe level through saving is too small relative to her
probability of dying.
When the financial market includes a risky asset, the corresponding strategy for buying term life
insurance is turned upside down. Specifically, for wealth less than the buy level wb (“b” for buy),
the individual does not buy life insurance, while for wealth greater than the buy level wb, she buys
insurance of b−w. Because of the existence of a risky asset, when wealth is low, the individual wants
to keep her wealth as unconstrained as possible to invest in the risky asset so that she can reach the
buy level.
In the no-risky-asset case, there is only one uncertainty, the time of death, so the individual
essentially compares the probability of surviving long enough to reach the safe level (while not buying
insurance) with the probability of dying before hitting 0 (while buying insurance). When there is a
risky asset in the market, there is additional uncertainty, the uncertainty in investment returns, and
the individual will gamble on that uncertainty to help meet her bequest goal.
Recall that we observed a similar phenomenon when maximizing expected utility of lifetime con-
sumption plus utility of wealth at death. Pliska and Ye (2007) have no risky asset in their financial
market, and the optimal strategy for purchasing insurance decreases with increasing wealth. The ana-
log in the bequest-goal setting is that, when there is no risky asset and r < λ < r + h, the individual
only purchases insurance when wealth is small enough. By contrast, Richard (1975) includes a risky
asset in his financial market, and the optimal strategy for purchasing insurance increases with wealth.
The analog in the bequest-goal setting is that, when there is a risky asset, the individual only purchases
insurance when wealth is large enough.
In the following proposition, we present φ and the corresponding optimal strategies for purchasing
life insurance and investing in the risky asset. We omit the proof because it is a straightforward
application of Lemma 2.1.
Theorem 3.1. If c = 0, the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal equals
φ(w) =


p(1−q)
p−q
(
w
wb
)q
, if 0 ≤ w < wb,
1− q(p−1)
p−q
(
ws−w
ws−wb
)p
, if wb ≤ w ≤ ws =
hb
r+h
,
(3.2)
in which
q =
1
2r
[
(r + λ+m)−
√
(r + λ+m)2 − 4rλ
]
∈ (0, 1), (3.3)
p =
1
2(r + h)
[
(r + h+ λ+m) +
√
(r + h+ λ+m)2 − 4(r + h)λ
]
> 1, (3.4)
m =
1
2
(
µ− r
σ
)2
, (3.5)
9and
wb =
1− q
p− q
ws ∈ (0, ws). (3.6)
When wealth equals w, the optimal amount of instantaneous term life insurance equals
D∗(w) = (b− w)1{wb≤w≤ws}, (3.7)
and the optimal amount invested in the risky asset equals
π∗(w) =


µ−r
σ2
w
1−q
, if 0 < w < wb,
µ−r
σ2
ws−w
p−1
, if wb ≤ w ≤ ws.
(3.8)
We present the following corollary of Theorem 3.1, in which we give the process of optimally
controlled wealth for wealth greater than wb and observe that wealth never reaches the safe level ws
nor does ruin occur.
Corollary 3.2. If c = 0, then the optimally controlled wealth process follows the dynamics
dW ∗t =


W ∗t
[(
r + 2m1−q
)
dt+ µ−r
σ
1
1−q dBt
]
, if W ∗t < wb,
(ws −W
∗
t )
[(
2m
p−1
− (r + h)
)
dt+ µ−r
σ
1
p−1
dBt
]
, if W ∗t > wb.
Thus, 0 < W ∗t < ws almost surely, for all t ≥ 0, if W0 = w ∈ (0, ws).
Remark 3.1. Optimally controlled wealth never reaches the safe level because ws − W
∗ behaves
like geometric Brownian motion for wealth near ws. Young (2004) observed a similar behavior of
optimally controlled wealth when minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin under a constant rate of
consumption. Indeed, the investment strategy when wealth lies between wb and ws is quite similar
to the investment strategy when minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin, in that both strategies
decrease linearly towards zero as wealth increases towards the safe level. Also, note that ruin will not
occur when optimally investing and buying life insurance becauseW ∗ behaves like geometric Brownian
motion near 0.
Remark 3.2. As the hazard rate λ increases to∞, one can show that the buy level wb decreases to 0.
This monotonicity makes sense because as the person is more likely to die, she will be more willing to
buy insurance for a fixed premium rate. Furthermore, as λ→∞, the individual is likely to die “in the
next second,” so the only way of reaching a bequest goal is to buy life insurance, which is supported
by wb → 0.
4. The case for which 0 < c ≤ rb
When the rate of consumption is large enough and when the premium rate for life insurance is
low enough, then it is optimal to buy life insurance of b− w for all 0 ≤ w ≤ ws (that is, wb = 0), and
we have an explicit expression for φ, as in Theorem 3.1. We present this case in Section 4.1.
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Otherwise, if wb > 0, then we cannot write φ explicitly. However, we can write it semi-explicitly
by using the Legendre transform to obtain an ansatz for φ; see Bayraktar and Young (2007, 2015) for
more details on this technique.
4.1 Buying life insurance at all levels of wealth
When the rate of consumption is large enough and when the premium rate is low enough, it is
optimal for the individual to buy life insurance at all levels of wealth. For this reason, we can explicitly
solve the maximization problem; see Theorem 4.2 below. First, we present the following lemma that
we use in the statement of Theorem 4.2. The proof of the lemma is straightforward, so we omit it.
Lemma 4.1. If h ≤ r
r+m λ, then C1 ≤ rb, in which C1 is defined by
C1 = hb
(
(r + h)p
λ
− 1
)
. (4.1)
Theorem 4.2. If h ≤ r
r+m λ and if C1 ≤ c ≤ rb, in which C1 ≤ rb is given in (4.1), then the
maximum probability φ of reaching the bequest goal equals
φ(w) = 1−
(
1−
w
ws
)p
, 0 ≤ w ≤ ws =
c+ hb
r + h
, (4.2)
in which p is given in (3.4). When wealth equals w ∈ (0, ws], the optimal amount of instantaneous
term life insurance equals
D∗(w) = b− w, (4.3)
and the optimal amount invested in the risky asset equals
π∗(w) =
µ− r
σ2
ws − w
p− 1
. (4.4)
Proof. We use Lemma 2.1 to prove this proposition. Because p > 1, the function φ in (4.2) is such
that φw > 0 and φww < 0 in (0, ws). It clearly satisfies the boundary conditions of (2.5), and one can
show that it satisfies the differential equation in (2.5) with D = b−w. As indicated in (2.8), to prove
D = b− w is optimal, we must prove
λ− h(b− w)φw(w) ≥ 0,
for all 0 ≤ w ≤ ws, or equivalently,
λ− h(b− w)
p
ws
(
1−
w
ws
)p−1
≥ 0. (4.5)
Inequality (4.5) holds at w = 0 if and only if
c ≥ C1.
Furthermore, the left side of inequality (4.5) increases with respect to w; thus, if C1 ≤ c ≤ rb, then
(4.5) holds on [0, ws]. Finally, the optimal investment strategy in (4.4) follows from (2.6) and (4.2).
11
Remark 4.1. At first blush, it seems as if buying life insurance when consumption is large and when
wealth is near zero would be more likely to lead to ruin than if the individual were not to buy life
insurance when wealth is near zero. However, the key is that insurance is inexpensive relative to the
rate of dying, h ≤ r
r+m λ. Recall that the individual only wins the game if her wealth at death is at
least equal to b, so if the consumption rate is great enough (C1 ≤ c ≤ rb), the negative tug on wealth
from −c means that she is better off buying life insurance at all levels of wealth rather than waiting
until wealth reaches some higher level and then buying life insurance.
Remark 4.2. From (4.4), we deduce that the second expression for optimally controlled wealth in
Corollary 3.2 also holds for all W ∗t > 0, when C1 ≤ c ≤ rb. Thus, ws −W
∗ behaves like geometric
Brownian motion for wealth near ws, so wealth never reaches the safe level ws.
4.2 Buying life insurance only when wealth is large enough
When 0 < c ≤ rb and c < C1, with C1 given in (4.1), it is optimal to buy life insurance only when
wealth is larger than some positive level, that is, wb > 0, as in the case for which c = 0. To obtain an
ansatz for φ, we (1) hypothesize that φ solves (2.9) with wb > 0, φw > 0, and φww < 0, (2) formally
define φ’s convex Legendre transform and determine its free-boundary problem, (3) solve this dual
free-boundary problem, and (4) compute the concave Legendre transform of that solution. Bayraktar
and Young (2007, Section 4.1) follow these steps to minimize the expectation of a non-increasing, non-
negative function of minimum wealth in a Black-Scholes market. Also, Bayraktar and Young (2015)
perform steps (3) and (4) when maximizing the probability of reaching the bequest goal without life
insurance in the market. They include those steps because, when 0 < c < rb, the convex Legendre
transform is the value function of an optimal stopping problem.
We omit the details of steps (1)-(4) because they are similar to those found in Bayraktar and
Young (2007, Section 4.1). Instead, in the following theorem, we present the candidate for φ thus
obtained and verify directly that it satisfies the conditions of Lemma 2.1.
Theorem 4.3. If 0 < c ≤ rb and if c < C1, then the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal
equals
φ(w) =


c
r
(α1−1)(1−α2)
α1−α2
[
−
(
y
y0
)α1
+
(
y
y0
)α2]
y0, if 0 ≤ w < wb = b−
λ
h
1
yb
,
1− λ
hp
ws−wb
b−wb
(
ws−w
ws−wb
)p
, if wb ≤ w ≤ ws =
c+hb
r+h ,
(4.6)
in which
β1 =
1
2m
[
(r + h− λ+m) +
√
(r + h− λ+m)2 + 4mλ
]
> α1,
α1 =
1
2m
[
(r − λ+m) +
√
(r − λ+m)2 + 4mλ
]
> 1,
α2 =
1
2m
[
(r − λ+m)−
√
(r − λ+m)2 + 4mλ
]
< 0,
(4.7)
with p = β1
β1−1
and m given in (3.4) and (3.5), respectively. The parameter yb > 0 is given by
λ
h
1
yb
= b+
c
r
[
α1(1− α2)
α1 − α2
yα1−1b0 +
α2(α1 − 1)
α1 − α2
yα2−1b0 − 1
]
, (4.8)
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in which yb0 ∈ (0, 1) uniquely solves
c
r
[
α1(1− α2)(β1 − α1)
α1 − α2
yα1−1b0 +
α2(α1 − 1)(β1 − α2)
α1 − α2
yα2−1b0
]
= (β1 − 1)
( c
r
− ws
)
, (4.9)
and the parameter y0 > yb is given by
y0 =
yb
yb0
. (4.10)
In the first expression of (4.6), for a given w ∈ [0, wb), y ∈ (yb, y0] uniquely solves
c
r
[
α1(1− α2)
α1 − α2
(
y
y0
)α1−1
+
α2(α1 − 1)
α1 − α2
(
y
y0
)α2−1]
=
c
r
− w. (4.11)
When wealth equals w ∈ (0, ws], the optimal amount of instantaneous term life insurance equals
D∗(w) = (b− w)1{wb≤w≤ws}, (4.12)
and the optimal amount invested in the risky asset equals
π∗(w) =


µ−r
σ2
c
r
(α1−1)(1−α2)
α1−α2
[
α1
(
y
y0
)α1−1
− α2
(
y
y0
)α2−1]
, if 0 < w < wb,
µ−r
σ2
ws−w
p−1
, if wb ≤ w ≤ ws.
(4.13)
Proof. First, note that there exists a unique solution yb0 ∈ (0, 1) of (4.9). Indeed, the left side of (4.9)
increases with respect to yb0, and as yb0 approaches 0+, the left side of (4.9) approaches −∞. When
yb0 = 1, the left side becomes
c
r
(
β1 −
r +m
m
)
,
which is greater than the right side if and only if c is less than
hb
m
(r + h)p− (r + h+m)
,
which equals C1. Thus, because c < C1, there exists a unique solution in (0, 1) of (4.9).
Second, we prove that yb > 0. It is straightforward to show that yb0 increases with c, which
implies that the right side of (4.8) increases with c. So, it is enough to show that the right side of (4.8)
is positive as c→ 0+. From (4.9), we deduce that
lim
c→0+
c
r
α2(α1 − 1)(β1 − α2)
α1 − α2
yα2−1b0 = −(β1 − 1)
hb
r + h
.
Thus, the limit of the right side of (4.8), as c→ 0+, equals
b−
β1 − 1
β1 − α2
hb
r + h
> 0.
Third, we prove that wb defined by wb = b−
λ
h
1
yb
is positive. In terms of yb0, we write
wb =
c
r
[
1−
α1(1− α2)
α1 − α2
yα1−1b0 −
α2(α1 − 1)
α1 − α2
yα2−1b0
]
, (4.14)
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and the quantity in the square brackets decreases with c. We have two cases to consider h ≤ r
r+m λ
and h > r
r+m
λ. If h ≤ r
r+m
λ, then C1 ≤ rb, so it is enough to show that wb ≥ 0 when c = C1. From
the above discussion, we know that if c = C1, then yb0 = 1; thus, (4.14) gives
wb
∣∣
c=C1
= 0.
If h > r
r+m λ, then C1 > rb, so it is enough to show that wb > 0 when c = rb. If c = rb, then
yb0 =
(
−
α2(α1 − 1)(β1 − α2)
α1(1− α2)(β1 − α1)
) 1
α1−α2
,
and (4.14) gives
wb
∣∣
c=rb
=
c
r

1− (α1(1− α2)
β1 − α2
) 1−α2
α1−α2
(
−
α2(α1 − 1)
β1 − α1
) α1−1
α1−α2

 ,
which increases with h because β1 increases with h. Thus, it is enough to show that wb
∣∣
c=rb
≥ 0 when
h = r
r+m λ. If h =
r
r+m λ, then rb = C1, and wb
∣∣
c=rb
= 0.
Fourth, we prove that wb < ws. From (4.9) and (4.14), we deduce that wb < ws if and only if
α1(1− α2)(β1 − α1)
α1 − α2
yα1−1b0 +
α2(α1 − 1)(β1 − α2)
α1 − α2
yα2−1b0 <
α1(1− α2)
α1 − α2
yα1−1b0 +
α2(α1 − 1)
α1 − α2
yα2−1b0 ,
which is equivalent to α2 y
α2−1
b0 < α1 y
α1−1
b0 , which holds because α2 < 0 < 1 < α1.
Finally, we use Lemma 2.1 to show that the expression in (4.6) equals the maximum probability
of reaching the bequest goal. When w = 0, (4.11) implies that y = y0, so the first expression in (4.6)
equals 0. Clearly, when w = ws, the second expression in (4.6) equals 1. For 0 ≤ w < wb,
φw(w) = y > 0, (4.15)
and
φww(w) = y
(
c
r
(α1 − 1)(1− α2)
α1 − α2
[
−α1
(
y
y0
)α1−1
+ α2
(
y
y0
)α2−1])−1
< 0. (4.16)
Using (4.15) and (4.16), one can show that the first expression in (4.6) satisfies the differential equation
in (2.9). It is straightforward to show that the second expression in (4.6) also satisfies the differential
equation in (2.9) in (wb, ws), with φw > 0 and φww < 0 in that interval.
We next show that φ given in (4.6) is C2 at w = wb. To that end, note that when w = wb, the
solution of (4.11) is y = yb; thus, from (4.15),
φw(wb−) = yb,
and from the second expression in (4.6),
φw(wb+) =
λ
h
1
b− wb
= yb.
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Next, from (4.16),
φww(wb−) = yb
(
c
r
(α1 − 1)(1− α2)
α1 − α2
(
−α1 y
α1−1
b0 + α2 y
α2−1
b0
))−1
,
and the second expression in (4.6) gives
φww(wb+) = −
λ
h
p− 1
(b− wb)(ws − wb)
= −yb
p− 1
ws − wb
.
The equality of these expressions for φww(wb−) and φww(wb+) follows from (4.9) after substituting
for wb via (4.14). Next, from the differential equation in (2.9),
λφ(wb−) = (rwb − c)φw(wb)−m
φ2w(wb)
φww(wb)
,
and
λφ(wb+) = (rwb − c)φw(wb)−m
φ2w(wb)
φww(wb)
+ (λ− h(b− wb)φw(wb)).
From φw(wb) = yb and wb = b−
λ
h
1
yb
, we deduce that φ(wb−) = φ(wb+). Thus, we have shown that φ
is C2 at w = wb. Furthermore, we have shown that the expression given in (4.6) satisfies the conditions
of Lemma 2.1 and, thus, equals the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal.
The optimal strategies in (4.12) and (4.13) follow from (2.6) and (2.7), respectively.
Remark 4.3. When it is optimal not to buy life insurance, that is, when 0 < w < wb, then the
optimal amount invested in the risky asset in (4.13) is independent both of the bequest goal b and of
the premium rate h, a surprising result. Indeed, the solution y
y0
of (4.11) is independent of b and h;
thus, the first expression in (4.13) is independent of b and h. Also, note that this independence holds
when c = 0; see (3.8) in Theorem 3.1.
Moreover, we will see in Proposition 6.4 that, when 0 < w < wb, π
∗(w) is identical to the amount
invested in the risky asset when life insurance is not available in the market. Thus, one might interpret
this by saying that, when 0 < w < wb, the individual is investing to attain any level of wealth greater
than current wealth.
When it is optimal to buy life insurance, that is, when wb ≤ w ≤ ws, the optimal investment
strategy in (4.13) is identical to the one given in (4.4) in Theorem 4.2. Also, note that the relationships
in (2.10) through (2.12) hold for the solution in Theorem 4.3, as expected.
Remark 4.4. From the expression for π∗(w) in (4.13) when wb ≤ w ≤ ws, we deduce that the
expression for optimally controlled wealth in Corollary 3.2 when W ∗t > wb also holds when 0 < c ≤ rb.
Thus, wealth never reaches the safe level.
We expected wb to decrease monotonically from
1−q
p−q
hb
r+h
as c increases because if h ≤ r
r+m
λ,
then wb
∣∣
c=C1
= 0. However, the following corollary shows that wb first increases and then decreases
as c increases, a surprising result.
Corollary 4.4. Suppose h ≤ r
r+m λ, which implies C1 ≤ rb. As c increases from 0 to C1, the buy level
wb first increases from the expression given in (3.6) and then decreases to 0. Moreover, if h >
r
r+m λ,
then the buy level wb increases at c = 0+.
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Proof. By differentiating (4.14) with respect to c and by substituting for ∂yb0
∂c
, which we obtain by
differentiating (4.9) with respect to c, we get
∂wb
∂c
=
1
r
[
1−
α1(1− α2)
α1 − α2
yα1−1b0 −
α2(α1 − 1)
α1 − α2
yα2−1b0
]
− (β1 − 1)
hb
c(r + h)
α1 y
α1−1
b0 − α2 y
α2−1
b0
α1(β1 − α1)y
α1−1
b0 − α2(β1 − α2)y
α2−1
b0
.
After substituting for (β1 − 1)
hb
c(r+h) from (4.9) and simplifying, we get
∂wb
∂c
∝ α1
(
r
r + h
β1 − α1 +
h
r + h
)
y1−α2b0 − α2
(
r
r + h
β1 − α2 +
h
r + h
)
y1−α1b0 + α1α2(α1 − α2).
(4.17)
Define a function k of y ∈ (0, 1) by the right side of (4.17). As c→ 0+, yb0 → 0+, and limy→0+ k(y) =
+∞. As c→ C1−, wb → 0+, yb0 → 1−, and
lim
y→1−
k(y) ∝ mβ1 − (r + h+m) < 0.
The derivative of k is proportional to
k′(y) ∝ α1(1− α2)
(
r
r + h
β1 − α1 +
h
r + h
)
yα1−α2 + α2(α1 − 1)
(
r
r + h
β1 − α2 +
h
r + h
)
,
which is negative for all y ∈ (0, 1) if k′(1) ≤ 0, or equivalently, if
rβ1 + h
r + h
≤
r +m
m
. (4.18)
It is straightforward to show that the left side of inequality (4.18) increases with h, and limh→∞
rβ1+h
r+h =
r+m
m
. Thus, (4.18) holds strictly for all h ≤ r
r+m λ, and we deduce that
∂wb
∂c
switches from positive to
negative as c increases from 0 to C1. Moreover,
∂wb
∂c
∣∣
c=0+
is positive, independent of the magnitude of
h.
Remark 4.5. We were surprised about the lack of monotonicity of wb with respect to c, and we
initially thought it might be due to the fact that ws also increases with c. That is, perhaps the
difference, ws − wb, increases with c. However, in work parallel to the proof of Corollary 4.4, one can
show that ws−wb first decreases and then increases as c increases. Specifically, as c initially increases
from 0+, wb increases more quickly than ws does.
5. The case for which c > rb
When the safe level ws =
c
r
> b, it is optimal not to buy life insurance when w ≥ b. When the
rate of consumption is large enough or when the premium rate for life insurance is low enough, it is
optimal to buy life insurance with death benefit b−w for all 0 < w < b; we present this case in Section
5.1. Otherwise, it is optimal to buy life insurance only for wealth lying between wb > 0 and b; we
present this case in Section 5.2.
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5.1 Buying life insurance at all levels of wealth less than the bequest goal
When the rate of consumption is large enough or when the premium rate is low enough, it is
optimal to buy life insurance at all levels of wealth less than the bequest goal. Unlike the problem in
Section 4.1, we do not have an explicit solution for φ because it is optimal not to buy life insurance
for wealth between b and c
r
. Thus, we rely on φ’s convex Legendre transform, as in Section 4.2, to
obtain an ansatz for φ. Again, we omit the details because they are similar to those in Bayraktar and
Young (2007, 2015). In Theorem 5.2 below, we present the candidate for φ and verify directly that it
satisfies the conditions of Lemma 2.1. First, we prove a useful lemma.
Lemma 5.1. Define the function g by
g(β) = r − (r + h)
β
α1
+ hβ, (5.1)
in which α1 is given in (4.7). Then,
g(β1) > 0 and g(β2) > 0,
in which β1 is given in (4.7) and
β2 =
1
2m
[
(r + h− λ+m)−
√
(r + h− λ+m)2 + 4mλ
]
< 0. (5.2)
Proof. First, g(β1) > 0 if and only if rα1 + ((α1 − 1)h− r)β1 > 0. When h = 0, the latter inequality
holds with equality because β1
∣∣
h=0
= α1. Thus, if we show that rα1+((α1−1)h− r)β1 increases with
h, then we are done.
∂
∂h
(rα1 + ((α1 − 1)h− r)β1) = (α1 − 1)β1 +
((α1 − 1)h− r)β1√
(r + h− λ+m)2 + 4mλ
∝ (α1 − 1)(h+
√
(r + h− λ+m)2 + 4mλ)− r,
which is positive if it is non-negative at h = 0 because h+
√
(r + h− λ+m)2 + 4mλ increases with
h. To show that
(α1 − 1)
√
(r − λ+m)2 + 4mλ− r ≥ 0,
use α1 − 1 =
1
p0−1
, in which p0 = p
∣∣
h=0
, with p given in (3.4), to obtain the equivalent inequality
√
(r + λ+m)2 − 4rλ− r(p0 − 1) ≥ 0,
or √
(r + λ+m)2 − 4rλ ≥ (r + λ+m)− 2r.
The latter inequality is straightforward to demonstrate; thus, we have shown g(β1) > 0.
Next, to prove g(β2) > 0, it is enough to show that g(β2) decreases with h and that
limh→∞ g(β2) ≥ 0.
∂
∂h
(
r − (r + h)
β2
α1
+ hβ2
)
∝ (α1 − 1)(h−
√
(r + h− λ+m)2 + 4mλ)− r,
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which is negative if it is non-positive as h→∞, because h−
√
(r + h− λ+m)2 + 4mλ increases with
h. The limit of h−
√
(r + h− λ+m)2 + 4mλ as h→∞ equals −(r − λ+m); thus,
lim
h→∞
(α1 − 1)(h−
√
(r + h− λ+m)2 + 4mλ)− r = −(α1 − 1)(r − λ+m)− r,
which one can show is non-positive. Thus, we have shown that g(β2) decreases with h.
To finish proving g(β2) > 0, we observe that, because limh→∞ β2 = 0 and limh→∞ hβ2 = −λ,
lim
h→∞
(
r − (r + h)
β2
α1
+ hβ2
)
= r +
α1 − 1
α1
(−λ) ∝ rp0 − λ,
in which p0 = p|h=0. It is easy to show that rp0 − λ > 0; thus, we have proved g(β2) > 0.
Theorem 5.2. Suppose c > rb, and suppose one of the following two conditions holds:
(1) h ≤ r
r+m λ, or
(2) h > r
r+m
λ and c ≥ C2, in which C2 > rb uniquely solves
c− rb
r(r + h)
[
c− rb
r(r + h)
g(β2)
hb
λ
β2 +
c+hb
r+h
(1− β2)
] 1−β2
β1−1
=
hb
λ
β1 −
c+hb
r+h
(β1 − 1)
g(β1)
. (5.3)
Then, the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal equals
φ(w) =


1− c−rb
r(r+h)
[
β1−1
β1−β2
g(β2)
(
y
yg
)β1
+ 1−β2
β1−β2
g(β1)
(
y
yg
)β2]
yg, if 0 ≤ w < b,
1−
(
c
r
− b
) yg
p0
(
c
r
−w
c
r
−b
)p0
, if b ≤ w ≤ ws =
c
r
,
(5.4)
in which β1, α1, and α2 are given in (4.7); β2, in (5.2); and, g, in (5.1). The parameter y0 > 0 is
given by
1
y0
=
c+ hb
r + h
β1 − 1
β1
+
c− rb
r(r + h)
g(β1)
β1
y1−β2g0 , (5.5)
in which yg0 ∈ (0, 1) uniquely solves
c− rb
r(r + h)
[
β1
β1 − β2
g(β2) y
1−β1
g0 −
β2
β1 − β2
g(β1) y
1−β2
g0
]
=
c+ hb
r + h
, (5.6)
and yg = y0yg0. Also, p0 = p
∣∣
h=0
= α1
α1−1
, in which p is given in (3.4). In the first expression of (5.4),
for a given w ∈ [0, b), y ∈ (yg , y0] uniquely solves
c− rb
r(r + h)
[
β1
β1 − β2
g(β2)
(
y
yg
)β1−1
−
β2
β1 − β2
g(β1)
(
y
yg
)β2−1]
=
c+ hb
r + h
− w. (5.7)
When wealth equals w ∈ (0, ws], the optimal amount of instantaneous term life insurance equals
D∗(w) = (b− w)+, (5.8)
and the optimal amount invested in the risky asset equals
π∗(w) =


µ−r
σ2
c−rb
r(r+h)
[
β1(β1−1)
β1−β2
g(β2)
(
y
yg
)β1−1
+ β2(1−β2)
β1−β2
g(β1)
(
y
yg
)β2−1]
, if 0 < w < b,
µ−r
σ2
c
r
−w
p0−1
, if b ≤ w ≤ ws.
(5.9)
18
Proof. We begin by showing that equation (5.6) has a unique solution yg0 ∈ (0, 1). Note that the left
side approaches +∞ as yg0 → 0+ because g(β2) > 0. Next, when yg0 = 1, the left side equals
c−rb
r+h
,
which is less than the right side. Finally, the left side decreases with yg0 ∈ (0, 1) if and only if
−β1(β1 − 1)g(β2)− β2(1− β2)g(β1) y
β1−β2
g0 < 0,
for all 0 < yg0 < 1, which holds if and only if it holds weakly when yg0 = 1 because g(β1) > 0. One
can show that −β1(β1 − 1)g(β2)− β2(1− β2)g(β1) ≤ 0 is equivalent to rp0 − λ ≥ 0, which is true; see
the last line of the proof of Lemma 5.1. (Recall p0 = p
∣∣
h=0
.)
Second, we prove that the expression in (5.4) satisfies the BVP in (2.9) with wb set equal to 0.
As in the proof of Theorem 4.3, for 0 ≤ w < b,
φw(w) = y > 0,
and
φww(w) = −y
(
c− rb
r(r + h)
[
β1(β1 − 1)
β1 − β2
g(β2)
(
y
yg
)β1−1
+
β2(1− β2)
β1 − β2
g(β1)
(
y
yg
)β2−1])−1
.
The expression for in square brackets increases with y ∈ (yg, y0]. Thus, φww < 0 for 0 < w < b if the
expression in square brackets is non-negative when y = yg, which is equivalent to rp0 − λ ≥ 0, which
is easy to show. The remainder of the proof that (5.4) satisfies (2.9) is similar to the corresponding
proof of Theorem 4.2, including the proof that φ in (5.4) is C2 at w = b, so we omit those details in
the interest of space.
Third, we prove that wb = 0, in which wb is defined in (2.8). Specifically, we show that
λ−h(b−w)φw(w) ≥ 0 for all 0 ≤ w < b, with φw determined by the first expression in (5.4). Because
φww < 0, this inequality holds for all 0 ≤ w < b if and only if it holds at w = 0, or equivalently,
1
y0
≥
hb
λ
,
because y0 = φw(0). Substitute for
1
y0
from the expression in (5.5) to obtain the equivalent inequality
c− rb
r(r + h)
y1−β2g0 ≥
hb
λ
β1 −
c+hb
r+h (β1 − 1)
g(β1)
. (5.10)
The right side of (5.10) is non-positive exactly when c ≥ C1, in which C1 is given in (4.1). Recall that
C1 ≤ rb if and only if h ≤
r
r+m λ. Thus, inequality (5.10) holds for all c > rb if h ≤
r
r+m λ.
For the remainder of the proof of inequality (5.10), assume that h > r
r+m λ; then, C1 > rb, and
inequality (5.10) automatically holds for all c ≥ C1. Thus, suppose c ∈ (rb, C1), so that the right side
of (5.10) is positive. Because the left side of (5.6) decreases with yg0, inequality (5.10) is equivalent to
c− rb
r(r + h)
β1
β1 − β2
g(β2)
[
hb
λ
β1 −
c+hb
r+h (β1 − 1)
c−rb
r(r+h) g(β1)
]−β1−1
1−β2
−
β2
β1 − β2
(
hb
λ
β1 −
c+ hb
r + h
(β1 − 1)
)
≥
c+ hb
r + h
,
⇐⇒
[
hb
λ
β1 −
c+hb
r+h (β1 − 1)
c−rb
r(r+h)
g(β1)
]−β1−1
1−β2
≥
hb
λ
β2 +
c+hb
r+h (1− β2)
c−rb
r(r+h)
g(β2)
.
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By following an argument similar to the proof of Lemma 5.1, one can show that the numerator of the
right side of this inequality is positive, and Lemma 5.1 implies that the denominator is positive. Thus,
this inequality is equivalent to
c− rb
r(r + h)
[
c− rb
r(r + h)
g(β2)
hb
λ
β2 +
c+hb
r+h
(1− β2)
] 1−β2
β1−1
≥
hb
λ
β1 −
c+hb
r+h (β1 − 1)
g(β1)
. (5.11)
The left side of (5.11) increases with c and the right side decreases with c. It follows that there exists
a unique solution C2 ∈ (rb, C1) of (5.3) such that (5.11) holds for all c ∈ [C2, C1). Recall that (5.10)
holds automatically for c ≥ C1. We have shown that, when h >
r
r+m λ, inequality (5.10) holds for all
c ≥ C2. Thus, wb = 0.
Finally, the optimal strategies in (5.8) and (5.9) follow from (2.6) and (2.7), respectively.
Note that the solution in Theorem 5.2 satisfies the relationships in (2.10) through (2.12). Also,
observe that the solution is continuous as the bequest goal approaches 0, that is, as the bequest goal
becomes smaller, then we expect (5.4) and (5.9) to approach 1 minus the minimum probability of
lifetime ruin and the corresponding optimal investment strategy, respectively, as obtained in Young
(2004). The following corollary states this result more formally.
Corollary 5.3. The solution given in Theorem 5.5 is continuous as b → 0+. In particular, for
0 ≤ w ≤ c
r
,
lim
b→0+
φ(w) = 1−
(
1−
rw
c
)p0
, (5.12)
and
lim
b→0+
π(w) =
µ− r
σ2
c
r
− w
p0 − 1
. (5.13)
In the next corollary, we show that π∗ in (5.9) decreases with wealth.
Corollary 5.4. If c > rb and if either condition in Theorem 5.2 holds, then the optimal amount
invested in the risky asset decreases as wealth increases.
Proof. Clearly, π∗(w) decreases with wealth when b ≤ w ≤ c
r
. For 0 < w < b, differentiate the first
expression in (5.9) with respect to w to learn that
dπ∗(w)
dw
∝
∂
∂w
y
yg
.
Next, differentiate (5.7) with respect to w to obtain
∂
∂w
y
yg
∝ −
[
β1(β1 − 1)
β1 − β2
g(β2)
(
y
yg
)β1−1
+
β2(1− β2)
β1 − β2
g(β1)
(
y
yg
)β2−1]
∝ −π∗(w) < 0.
Remark 5.1. When minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin, the optimal amount invested in the
risky asset decreases (linearly) with wealth. For the problem in this paper, if the individual is buying
life insurance, then the bequest goal is covered and the remaining problem is to avoid ruin. Thus,
we expect π∗ in (5.9) to share properties with the optimal investment strategy for the problem of
minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin. In fact, π∗ for wealth between b and c
r
is identical to the
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amount invested in the risky asset when minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin (Young, 2004).
Also, as in Young (2004) and as in the cases considered in Sections 3 and 4, wealth never reaches the
safe level.
5.2 Buying life insurance only when wealth is large enough and less than the bequest goal
From Theorem 5.2, we know that the remaining case for us to address is h > r
r+m λ and rb < c <
C2. Recall that h >
r
r+m
λ is a necessary condition for a solution C2 > rb of (5.3) to exist. For this
case, based on Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.3, we hypothesize that the buy level wb is positive. Under
this hypothesis, in work not shown here, we solve the free-boundary problem of φ’s convex Legendre
transform. In Theorem 5.7 below, we show that the concave Legendre transform of this (unstated)
solution of the free-boundary problem equals the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal.
First, we prove two useful lemmas.
Lemma 5.5. Define the function ℓ by
ℓ(α, β) = β −
(
h
λ
β + 1
)
α. (5.14)
Then,
ℓ(α1, β1) < 0, ℓ(α1, β2) < 0, ℓ(α2, β1) > 0, and ℓ(α2, β2) < 0,
in which α1, α2, and β1 are given in (4.7), and β2 in (5.2).
Proof. We prove these four inequalities in turn. First, when h = 0, ℓ(α1, β1) = α1 − α1 = 0. Thus,
to show that ℓ(α1, β1) < 0, it is enough to show that ℓ(α1, β1) decreases with h. To that end,
∂
∂h
ℓ(α1, β1) ∝ λ− α1
(
h+
√
(r + h− λ+m)2 + 4mλ
)
,
and this expression is negative for all h > 0 if it is negative when h = 0, which is straightforward to
show.
Second, limh→∞ ℓ(α1, β2) = 0 −
(
1
λ
(−λ) + 1
)
α1 = 0. Thus, to show that ℓ(α1, β2) < 0, it is
enough to show that ℓ(α1, β2) increases with h. To that end,
∂
∂h
ℓ(α1, β2) ∝ λ− α1
(
h−
√
(r + h− λ+m)2 + 4mλ
)
,
and, because this expression decreases with h, it is positive for all h > 0 if its limit, as h approaches
∞, is positive. Now,
lim
h→∞
(
λ− α1
(
h−
√
(r + h− λ+m)2 + 4mλ
))
= λ+ α1(r − λ+m),
which one can show is positive.
Third, because α2 < 0 and β1 > 1, it is clear that ℓ(α2, β1) > 0.
Fourth, when h = 0, ℓ(α2, β2) = α2 − α2 = 0, and limh→∞ ℓ(α2, β2) = 0 −
(
1
λ
(−λ) + 1
)
α2 = 0.
Next,
∂
∂h
ℓ(α2, β2) ∝ λ− α2
(
h−
√
(r + h− λ+m)2 + 4mλ
)
,
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which is negative when h = 0 and monotonically increases to a positive number as h approaches ∞.
Thus, ℓ(α2, β2) < 0 for all h > 0.
Lemma 5.6. If c > rb, then the following equation has a unique solution x > 1 :
1 =
(
c− rb
c(r + h)
)α1−α2 ( 1
α1 − 1
)α1−1( 1
1− α2
)1−α2
×
[
h
(
(α1 − 1)−
r
λ
α1
)
−
ℓ(α1, β1)g(β2)
β1 − β2
xβ1−1 +
ℓ(α1, β2)g(β1)
β1 − β2
xβ2−1
]α1−1
×
[
h
(
(1− α2) +
r
λ
α2
)
+
ℓ(α2, β1)g(β2)
β1 − β2
xβ1−1 −
ℓ(α2, β2)g(β1)
β1 − β2
xβ2−1
]1−α2
,
(5.15)
in which α1, α2, and β1 are given in (4.7) and β2 in (5.2).
Proof. When x = 1, the right side of (5.15) equals 0, and as x → ∞, the right side approaches ∞.
Thus, if we show that the right side increases with x, then we are done. Because ℓ(α1, β1)g(β2) < 0,
ℓ(α1, β2)g(β1) < 0, β1 > 1, and β2 < 0, the factor on the second line of (5.15) increases with x. Finally,
d
dx
(
ℓ(α2, β1)g(β2)x
β1−1 − ℓ(α2, β2)g(β1)x
β2−1
)
∝ ℓ(α2, β1)g(β2)(β1 − 1)x
β1−β2 + ℓ(α2, β2)g(β1)(1− β2),
is positive for all x > 1 if it is positive when x = 1. One can show that
ℓ(α2, β1)g(β2)(β1 − 1) + ℓ(α2, β2)g(β1)(1− β2) ∝
(
1−
h
λ
α2
)
(rp0 − λ)− α2m,
and the right side is positive because α2 < 0 and rp0 − λ > 0, in which p0 = p|h=0.
Theorem 5.7. If h > r
r+m
λ and rb < c < C2, then the maximum probability of reaching the bequest
goal equals
φ(w) =


c
r
(α1−1)(1−α2)
α1−α2
[
−
(
y
y0
)α1
+
(
y
y0
)α2]
y0, if 0 ≤ w < wb = b−
λ
h
1
yb
,
1− c−rb
r(r+h)
[
β1−1
β1−β2
g(β2)
(
y
yg
)β1
+ 1−β2
β1−β2
g(β1)
(
y
yg
)β2]
yg, if wb ≤ w < b,
1−
(
c
r
− b
) yg
p0
(
c
r
−w
c
r
−b
)p0
, if b ≤ w ≤ ws =
c
r
,
(5.16)
in which α1, α2, and β1 are given in (4.7); β2 in (5.2); g in (5.1); and p0 = p
∣∣
h=0
= α1
α1−1
. The
parameter yb > 0 is given by
λ
h
1
yb
= b+
c
r
[
α1(1− α2)
α1 − α2
yα1−1b0 +
α2(α1 − 1)
α1 − α2
yα2−1b0 − 1
]
, (5.17)
in which yb0 ∈ (0, 1) is given by
c
r
(1− α2) y
α1−1
b0 =
c− rb
r(r + h)
[
h
(
(1− α2) +
r
λ
α2
)
+
ℓ(α2, β1)g(β2)
β1 − β2
yβ1−1bg −
ℓ(α2, β2)g(β1)
β1 − β2
yβ2−1bg
]
,
(5.18)
22
and ybg > 1 uniquely solves (5.15). The parameters yg and y0 equal
yg =
yb
ybg
and y0 =
yb
yb0
.
In the first expression of (5.16), for a given w ∈ [0, wb), y ∈ (yb, y0] uniquely solves (4.11). In the
second expression of (5.16), for a given w ∈ [wb, b), y ∈ (yg, yb] uniquely solves (5.7).
When wealth equals w ∈ (0, ws], the optimal amount of instantaneous term life insurance equals
D∗(w) = (b− w)1{wb≤w≤b}, (5.19)
and the optimal amount invested in the risky asset equals
π∗(w) =


µ−r
σ2
c
r
(α1−1)(1−α2)
α1−α2
[
α1
(
y
y0
)α1−1
− α2
(
y
y0
)α2−1]
, if 0 ≤ w < wb,
µ−r
σ2
c−rb
r(r+h)
[
β1(β1−1)
β1−β2
g(β2)
(
y
yg
)β1−1
+ β2(1−β2)
β1−β2
g(β1)
(
y
yg
)β2−1]
, if wb ≤ w < b,
µ−r
σ2
c
r
−w
p0−1
, if b ≤ w ≤ ws.
(5.20)
Proof. From Lemma 5.6, we know that there is a unique solution ybg > 1 of (5.15). Next, we prove
that yb0 defined by (5.18) lies between 0 and 1. It is easy to show that (1 − α2) +
r
λ
α2 is positive;
thus, the right side of (5.18) is positive, so yb0 > 0. One can use (5.15) and (5.18) to show that yb0 = 1
if and only if c = C2, the unique solution of (5.3). Thus, to prove that yb0 < 1, it is enough to prove
that yb0 in (5.18) increases with c. To that end, compute
∂yb0
∂c
via (5.18), compute
∂ybg
∂c
via (5.15), and
solve for ∂yb0
∂c
to obtain
∂yb0
∂c
∝
N1D2 +N2D1
(α1 − 1)N1D2 − (1− α2)N2D1
, (5.21)
in which
N1 = (β1 − 1)ℓ(α1, β1)g(β2) y
β1−1
bg + (1− β2)ℓ(α1, β2)g(β1) y
β2−1
bg ,
N2 = (β1 − 1)ℓ(α2, β1)g(β2) y
β1−1
bg + (1− β2)ℓ(α2, β2)g(β1) y
β2−1
bg ,
D1 = h(β1 − β2)
(
(α1 − 1)−
r
λ
α1
)
− ℓ(α1, β1)g(β2) y
β1−1
bg + ℓ(α1, β2)g(β1) y
β2−1
bg ,
and
D2 = h(β1 − β2)
(
(1− α2) +
r
λ
α2
)
+ ℓ(α2, β1)g(β2) y
β1−1
bg − ℓ(α2, β2)g(β1) y
β2−1
bg .
The numerator on the right side of (5.21) simplifies to the following.
N1D2 +N2D1 ∝ h(β1 − 1)
(
(β1 − 1)−
r + h
λ
β1
)
g(β2) y
β1−1
bg
− h(1− β2)
(
(1− β2) +
r + h
λ
β2
)
g(β1) y
β2−1
bg
− (β1 − β2)g(β1)g(β2) y
β1−1
bg y
β2−1
bg .
It is straightforward to show that
(
(β1 − 1)−
r+h
λ
β1
)
< 0 and
(
(1− β2) +
r+h
λ
β2
)
> 0; thus, N1D2+
N2D1 < 0, from which it follows
∂yb0
∂c
∝ (1− α2)N2D1 − (α1 − 1)N1D2. (5.23)
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If we show that N1 < 0, N2 > 0, D1 > 0, and D2 > 0, then we will have shown that yb0 increases with
c. We prove these four inequalities in turn.
First, N1 < 0 follows directly from ℓ(α1, β1) < 0 and ℓ(α1, β2) < 0, which we proved in Lemma
5.5, and from g(β1) > 0 and g(β2) > 0, which we proved in Lemma 5.1.
Second, N2 > 0 is equivalent to
(β1 − 1)ℓ(α2, β1)g(β2)x
β1−β2 + (1− β2)ℓ(α2, β2)g(β1) > 0,
for all x > 1, which is equivalent to
(β1 − 1)ℓ(α2, β1)g(β2) + (1− β2)ℓ(α2, β2)g(β1) ≥ 0, (5.22)
because (β1 − 1)ℓ(α2, β1)g(β2) > 0. Inequality (5.22) is straightforward, but tedious, to demonstrate.
Third, D1 increases with ybg > 1; thus, we only need to show that D1 ≥ 0 when ybg = 1. Because
D1
∣∣
ybg=1
= 0, it follows that D1 > 0 for all ybg > 1.
Fourth, D2 > 0 follows directly from
(
(1− α2) +
r
λ
α2
)
> 0, from ℓ(α2, β1) > 0 and ℓ(α2, β2) < 0,
which we proved in Lemma 5.5, and from g(β1) > 0 and g(β2) > 0, which we proved in Lemma 5.1.
Thus, we have proved that yb0 increases with c.
Next, we prove that yb > 0. Because yb0 increases with c, the right side of (5.17) increases with
c, so it is enough to show that the right side of (5.17) is positive as c→ rb+. From (5.15), we deduce
that
lim
c→rb+
(c− rb)yβ1−1bg =
(
−
α1 − 1
ℓ(α1, β1)
) α1−1
α1−α2
(
1− α2
ℓ(α2, β1)
) 1−α2
α1−α2 β1 − β2
g(β2)
rb(r + h),
which implies that
lim
c→rb+
yb0 =
(
−
α1 − 1
1− α2
ℓ(α2, β1)
ℓ(α1, β1)
) 1
α1−α2
. (5.23)
Thus, the limit of the right side of (5.17), as c→ rb+, equals
bα1(1− α2)
(
−
α1 − 1
1− α2
ℓ(α2, β1)
ℓ(α1, β1)
) al1−1
α1−α2
+ bα2(α1 − 1)
(
−
α1 − 1
1− α2
ℓ(α2, β1)
ℓ(α1, β1)
)− 1−α2
α1−α2
∝ α1ℓ(α2, β1)− α2ℓ(α1, β1) = β1(α1 − α2) > 0.
From yb > 0, it follows that wb = b−
λ
h
1
yb
< b.
Next, we prove that wb > 0. From the expression in (5.17), we obtain the same expression for wb,
as a function of yb0, as the one in (4.14). The expression in square brackets in (4.14) decreases with c
because yb0 increases with c. Thus, to show that wb > 0, it is enough to show that
lim
c→rb+
1−
α1(1− α2)
α1 − α2
yα1−1b0 −
α2(α1 − 1)
α1 − α2
yα2−1b0 ≥ 0,
which, from (5.23), is equivalent to
(
−
α1 − 1
ℓ(α1, β1)
)α1−1( 1− α2
ℓ(α2, β1)
)1−α2
≤ 1. (5.24)
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The term −ℓ(α1, β1) is positive and increases with h. Thus, to show that the first factor on the left
side of (5.24) is less than 1 for all h > r
r+m
λ, it is enough to show that the first factor is less than or
equal to 1 for h = r
r+m
λ.
−
α1 − 1
ℓ(α1, β1)
∣∣∣∣
h= r
r+m
λ
≤ 1
is equivalent to
hp
λ
∣∣∣∣
h= r
r+m
λ
· α1 ≥ 1,
which is true because the left side reduces to α1, and we know that α1 > 1. Also, the second factor
on the left side of (5.24) is less than 1 for all h ≥ 0. Thus, we have proved that wb > 0.
The rest of the proof is similar to the proofs of Theorems 4.3 and 5.2, so we omit those details.
Remark 5.2. As noted in Remark 4.3 for the case studied in Section 4.2, when 0 < w < wb, the
optimal amount invested in the risky asset is independent of both b and h, a surprising myopic result.
Observe that the solution in Theorem 5.7 is continuous as the bequest goal approaches 0, as in
Corollary 5.3 for the case in Section 5.1.
Corollary 5.8. The solution given in Theorem 5.7 is continuous as b → 0+. In particular, for
0 ≤ w ≤ c
r
,
lim
b→0+
φ(w) = 1−
(
1−
rw
c
)p0
,
and
lim
b→0+
π∗(w) =
µ− r
σ2
c
r
− w
p0 − 1
.
In the next corollary, we observe that the optimal amount invested in the risky asset decreases
with wealth if w ≥ wb, as shown in Corollary 5.4 for the case in Section 5.1; there, wb = 0. We omit
the proof because it is identical to the proof of Corollary 5.4. Also, Remark 5.1 applies in this case.
Corollary 5.9. If h > r
r+m
λ and rb < c < C2, then the optimal amount invested in the risky asset
decreases as wealth increases for wb ≤ w ≤ ws.
6. Properties of φ, D∗, and π∗
In this section, we prove general properties of the solution obtained in Sections 3 through 5. As
the premium rate for life insurance increases, we expect the maximum probability of reaching the
bequest goal to decrease because it becomes more difficult for the individual to reach her bequest goal.
We demonstrate this in the following proposition and find the limits of φ as h→ 0+ and h→∞.
Proposition 6.1. The maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal (weakly) decreases with h.
Furthermore,
lim
h→0+
φ(w) = 1−
(
1−
rw
c
)p0
, 0 ≤ w ≤
c
r
, (6.1)
in which
p0 = p
∣∣
h=0
=
1
2r
[
(r + λ+m) +
√
(r + λ+m)2 − 4rλ
]
> 1, (6.2)
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and
lim
h→∞
φ(w) = φ0(w), 0 ≤ w ≤ max
( c
r
, b
)
, (6.3)
in which φ0 is the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal when life insurance is not available
(Bayraktar and Young, 2015).
Proof. In Sections 3 through 5, we showed that φ in (2.2) is a classical solution of its HJB equation
(2.9). Define F by
F (w, f, fw, fww;h) = λf − (rw − c)fw −max
pi
[
(µ− r)π fw +
1
2
σ2π2fww
]
− (λ− h(b− w)+fw)+.
Note that F increases with f and decreases with fww; thus, F satisfies the monotonicity condition
(0.1) in Crandall et al. (1992). Suppose h1 < h2, and let φ(i) denote the maximum probability of
reaching the bequest goal when h = hi for i = 1, 2, with corresponding safe level w
(i)
s . Note that
w
(1)
s ≤ w
(2)
s . We have F
(
w, φ(i), φ
(i)
w , φ
(i)
ww;hi
)
= 0 for i = 1, 2, and
F
(
w, φ(2), φ(2)w , φ
(2)
ww;h
1
)
=
(
λ− h2(b− w)+φ
(2)
w
)
+
−
(
λ− h1(b− w)+φ
(2)
w
)
+
≤ 0,
because φ increases with w. Thus, φ(2) is a viscosity subsolution of F
(
w, φ, φw, φww;h
1
)
= 0. Because
φ(1) is a classical solution of this equation, because φ(2)(0) = φ(1)(0), and because φ(2)
(
w
(1)
s
)
≤ 1 =
φ(1)
(
w
(1)
s
)
, it follows from Crandall et al. (1992, Theorem 3.3) that φ(2) ≤ φ(1) on
[
0, w
(1)
s
]
.
Furthermore, from the stability of viscosity solutions, we can find the limit of φ as h → 0+ or
h → ∞ by taking the corresponding limit of the HJB equation. To that end, note that as h → 0+,
(2.9) becomes 

λ(Φ− 1) = (rw − c)Φw +max
pi
[
(µ− r)πΦw +
1
2
σ2π2Φww
]
,
Φ(0) = 0, Φ(c/r) = 1,
(6.4)
because limh→0+ hφw(w) = 0 for all w ∈ (0, b), and the solution of this BVP is given in (6.1). Also,
note that as h→∞, (2.9) becomes


λ(Φ− 1{w≥b}) = (rw − c)Φw +max
pi
[
(µ− r)πΦw +
1
2
σ2π2Φww
]
,
Φ(0) = 0, Φ(max(c/r, b)) = 1.
(6.5)
The BVP in (6.5) is the one solved by φ0, as computed in Bayraktar and Young (2015).
Remark 6.1. As h approaches 0, the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal approaches
1 minus the minimum probability of lifetime ruin (Young, 2004). We expect this result because, as h
approaches 0, covering the bequest goal becomes costless, so the problem reduces to one of avoiding
ruin.
Remark 6.2. From the solution to the optimization problem given in Theorems 4.2 and 5.2, it is
optimal to buy insurance for all levels of wealth less than b if either of the following holds:
(a) h ≤ r
r+m λ and c ≥ C1; or
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(b) h > r
r+m λ and c ≥ C2.
Thus, it is optimal to buy life insurance for all levels of wealth less than b if the rate of consumption
is large enough, in which large enough depends on h.
As the premium rate becomes arbitrarily small, covering the bequest goal with life insurance
becomes costless, and we expect the buying level to become arbitrarily small. By contrast, as the
premium rate becomes arbitrarily large, the individual will not purchase life insurance, that is, we
expect the buying level to approach b. These limits are easy to prove, so we present the next proposition
without proof.
Proposition 6.2. The buying level for insurance wb obeys the following limits:
lim
h→0+
wb = 0,
and
lim
h→∞
wb = b.
As the premium rate for life insurance increases, we expect the amount invested in the risky asset
to increase because the individual has to take on more financial risk to reach her bequest goal. We
demonstrate this in the following proposition and find the limits of π∗ as h→ 0+ and h→∞.
Proposition 6.3. The optimal amount invested in the risky asset (weakly) increases as h increases.
Furthermore,
lim
h→0+
π∗(w) = πmin(w), 0 ≤ w ≤
c
r
, (6.6)
in which πmin is the optimal amount invested in the risky asset when minimizing the probability of
lifetime ruin, specifically,
πmin(w) =
µ− r
σ2
c
r
− w
p0 − 1
,
and
lim
h→∞
π∗(w) = π0(w), 0 ≤ w ≤ max
( c
r
, b
)
, (6.7)
in which π0 is the optimal amount invested in the risky asset when life insurance is not available
(Bayraktar and Young, 2015).
Proof. From the solution in Sections 3 through 5, we know that π∗(w) is independent of h for
0 ≤ w < wb (although wb itself depends on h) and for b ≤ w ≤
c
r
; the latter applies to the solution in
Section 5 only. For wb < w < min(ws, b), we will find a differential equation for π
∗ and use comparison
to show that π∗ increases with h. To that end, from the solution in Sections 3 through 5, we know
that φ solves the following differential equation for wb < w < min(ws, b):
λ(φ− 1) = ((r + h)w − (c+ hb))φw −m
φ2w
φww
,
or equivalently,
λ(φ − 1) = ((r + h)w − (c+ hb))φw +
µ− r
2
φw π
∗,
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because π∗ = −µ−r
σ2
φw
φww
. Differentiate this expression with respect to w and rewrite the result to
obtain a differential equation for π∗:
µ− r
2
π∗w +
µ− r
σ2
(c+ hb)− (r + h)w
π∗
+ (r + h− λ−m) = 0. (6.8)
Differentiate (6.8) with respect to h to obtain a differential equation for π∗h:
µ− r
2
(π∗h)w −
µ− r
σ2
(c+ hb)− (r + h)w
(π∗)2
π∗h +
µ− r
σ2
b− w
π∗
+ 1 = 0. (6.9)
Redefine the independent variable so that min(ws, b) becomes the new origin: w˜ := min(ws, b)−w, and
π˜∗(w˜) := π∗(min(ws, b)− w˜). Then, (c+hb)− (r+h)w = (r+h)w˜+(c− rb)+, b−w = w˜+(b−ws)+,
π∗h = π˜
∗
h, (π
∗
h)w = −(π˜
∗
h)w˜, and (6.9) becomes
µ− r
2
(π˜∗h)w˜ +
µ− r
σ2
(r + h)w˜ + (c− rb)+
(π˜∗)2
π˜∗h −
µ− r
σ2
w˜ + (b− ws)+
π˜∗
− 1 = 0.
Define G by
G(w˜, f, fw˜) =
µ− r
2
fw˜ +
µ− r
σ2
(r + h)w˜ + (c− rb)+
(π˜∗)2
f −
µ− r
σ2
w˜ + (b− ws)+
π˜∗
− 1.
Note that G increases with f ; thus, G satisfies the monotonicity condition (0.1) in Crandall et al.
(1992). Then, G(w˜, π˜∗h, (π˜
∗
h)w˜) = 0, and
G(w˜, 0, 0) = −
µ− r
σ2
w˜ + (b− ws)+
π˜∗
− 1 < 0.
After a great deal of algebra, one can show that π˜∗h(0+) = π
∗
h(min(ws, b)−) ≥ 0; then, from Crandall
et al. (1992, Theorem 3.3), we conclude that π∗h(w) ≥ 0 for wb < w < min(ws, b).
One can show the limits in (6.6) and (6.7) on a case-by-case basis by using the solution given in
Sections 3 through 5. In the interest of space, we do not include those calculations here.
Proposition 6.3 tells us that π∗ ≥ πmin because the problem of minimizing the probability of
lifetime ruin is equivalent to the problem we obtain as h → 0+. Furthermore, the expressions for π∗
in (5.9) and (5.20) show us that π∗(w) = πmin(w) for all b ≤ w ≤ c
r
.
Bayraktar and Young (2015) compute the optimal investment strategy to maximize the probability
of reaching the bequest goal when life insurance is not available. Proposition 6.3 tells us that π∗ ≤ π0.
By comparing the results in Bayraktar and Young (2015) with the solution here when it is optimal
not to purchase life insurance, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 6.4. Let πmin and π0 denote the optimal investment strategies to minimize the probability
of lifetime ruin and to maximize the probability of reaching the bequest goal when life insurance is not
available, respectively. Then,
πmin(w) ≤ π∗(w) = π0(w), 0 ≤ w < wb, (6.10)
πmin(w) ≤ π∗(w) ≤ π0(w), wb ≤ w < b, (6.11)
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and
πmin(w) = π∗(w) = π0(w), b ≤ w ≤
c
r
, (6.12)
with the understanding that π∗(w) = 0 if w ≥ ws.
Remark 6.3. The investment strategy when it is optimal not to buy life insurance (0 ≤ w < wb or
b ≤ w ≤ c
r
) is myopic because the individual is seemingly indifferent to the presence or lack of life
insurance. On the other hand, when it is optimal to buy life insurance (wb ≤ w < b), the presence
of life insurance leads the individual to invest less in the risky asset than when life insurance is not
available. To reach the bequest goal, the individual does not have to take on as much risk when life
insurance is available.
Life insurance allows the individual to achieve her bequest goal without the necessity of wealth
reaching the bequest target itself. If no life insurance is available, the only way the individual will
reach her bequest goal is if wealth itself reaches that bequest goal b.
We find it interesting that the optimal investment strategy when wealth is greater than the bequest
goal b is identical to the corresponding one for minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin, which is
independent of the ruin level. Once wealth is greater than the bequest goal b, our individual invests
as if she were minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin with ruin level b, or any ruin level, for that
matter (Bayraktar and Young, 2007).
We end this section with two numerical examples. In the following example, we demonstrate how
the optimal strategies change as c increases.
Example 6.1. Consider the following parameters values: r = 0.03, µ = 0.06, σ = 0.20, λ = 0.04,
h = 0.05, and b = 1.0. Thus, C1 = 0.0736, as defined by equation (4.1), and C2 = 0.0629, as defined
by equation (5.3); note that h > r
r+m
λ. We have the following table that displays how the optimal
strategies wb and π
∗ vary as c increases from 0 to C2. We set π
∗(w) = 0 when w ≥ ws.
c wb ws π
∗(0.1) π∗(0.3) π∗(0.5) π∗(0.7) π∗(0.9)
0 0.375 0.625 0.212 0.637 0.397 0 0
0.0005 0.381 0.631 0.207 0.622 0.417 0 0
0.005 0.403 0.688 0.428 0.724 0.560 0 0
0.01 0.397 0.750 0.748 0.983 0.794 0.159 0
0.02 0.354 0.875 1.407 1.597 1.191 0.556 0
0.03 0.295 1.000 2.072 2.223 1.588 0.953 0.318
0.04 0.215 1.333 2.693 2.575 1.932 1.284 0.615
0.05 0.124 1.667 3.359 2.893 2.239 1.573 0.874
0.06 0.028 2.000 3.851 3.194 2.528 1.846 1.122
0.0629 0 2.097 3.937 3.278 2.609 1.923 1.193
Note that, in this example, even though h > r
r+m λ = 0.02909, wb first increases from 0.375 to 0.403
and then decreases to 0 as c increases from 0 to C2.
Recall that the dollar amounts invested in the risky asset are relative to a bequest goal of b = 1,
so one can think of the dollar amounts as proportions of the bequest goal, as discussed in Remark 2.5.
We see that π∗ is not monotone in c and is not monotone in w for 0 < w < wb. However, from the
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expressions in (4.4) and (4.13) and from Corollaries 5.4, and 5.9, we know that π∗ decreases with w
for w > wb. Also note that, in this example, π
∗ eventually increases with c because the individual
needs to invest more in the risky asset to cover her additional consumption.
Example 6.2. Continue with the parameter values of the Example 6.1, except that we will examine
how the optimal strategies vary with the price of insurance h; recall that λ = 0.04 and r
r+m λ = 0.02909.
We have the following table for c = 0.02 < rb = 0.03:
h wb ws π
∗(0.1) π∗(0.3) π∗(0.5) π∗(0.7) π∗(0.9)
0 0 0.667 0.400 0.259 0.118 0 0
0.01 0 0.750 0.707 0.490 0.272 0.0544 0
0.02 0 0.800 1.078 0.770 0.462 0.154 0
0.03 0.133 0.833 1.407 1.092 0.683 0.273 0
0.04 0.259 0.857 1.407 1.447 0.927 0.408 0
0.05 0.357 0.875 1.407 1.600 1.191 0.556 0
0.10 0.609 0.923 1.407 1.600 1.833 1.402 0.145
0.20 0.782 0.957 1.407 1.600 1.833 2.106 0.724
0.50 0.907 0.981 1.407 1.600 1.833 2.106 2.406
∞ b = 1 1.000 1.407 1.600 1.833 2.106 2.406
Note that π∗ (weakly) increases with h, as expected from Proposition 6.3. Also, π∗ is independent of
h for 0 ≤ w < wb, as expected from (6.10) in Proposition 6.4.
7. Summary
We determined the optimal strategies for purchasing instantaneous term life insurance and for
investing in a risky asset in order to maximize the probability of reaching a specific bequest goal
b. We proved the following properties of these optimal strategies and the corresponding maximum
probability.
• The premium rate for life insurance h acts as a parameter to connect two seemingly unrelated
problems. First, as h → 0+, the problem becomes equivalent to minimizing the probability of
lifetime ruin. Second, as h→∞, the problem becomes equivalent to maximizing the probability
of reaching the bequest goal without life insurance in the market. See Propositions 6.1 through
6.4 for focused results about this connection.
• As in the problem of minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin (Young, 2004), optimally controlled
wealth never reaches the safe level.
• As h increases, the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal (weakly) decreases, and
the optimal amount invested in the risky asset (weakly) increases because one has to take on
more risk in the financial market to reach the bequest goal if one does not buy life insurance; see
Propositions 6.1 and 6.3.
• It is optimal to buy life insurance for all levels of wealth (less than b) if the rate of consumption
is large enough, in which large enough depends on the premium rate; see Theorems 4.2 and 5.5,
as well as Remark 6.2. This result is surprising because if wealth is close to zero and one buys
insurance, then the probability of ruin is greater than if one does not buy insurance. However,
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the goal is not simply not to ruin; the goal is to reach the bequest b, which can only be achieved
by buying sufficient life insurance if wealth is small.
• It is optimal to buy life insurance only when wealth lies between a positive buying level wb > 0
and b if either of the following conditions holds:
(a) h ≤ r
r+m λ and 0 ≤ c < C1, or
(b) h > r
r+m
λ and 0 ≤ c < C2.
Thus, it is optimal not to buy life insurance if one is poor and if the rate of consumption is small
enough, in which ‘small enough’ depends on the premium rate.
• When it is optimal to buy life insurance, the optimal amount invested in the risky asset decreases
with wealth (sometimes linearly), which is the case when minimizing the probability of lifetime
ruin. This result makes sense because if one is purchasing life insurance, then the bequest goal is
covered, and the remaining problem is to avoid ruin. In fact, for wealth greater than the bequest
goal b, the optimal amount to invest in the risky asset is identical to the corresponding amount
when minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin; see Proposition 6.4 and Remark 6.3.
• When it is optimal not to buy life insurance, the optimal amount invested in the risky asset
is independent of both the bequest goal and the price of life insurance and is identical to the
corresponding amount when maximizing the probability of reaching the bequest goal without
life insurance in the market; see Proposition 6.4. We were surprised by this myopic investment
behavior.
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